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Introduction
Much of prevailing industrial relations theory rests on the premise that there exist different "national models" of industrial relations. This approach rests on three distinct but interrelated assumptions : 1) that national borders are synonymous with the scope of markets; 2) that national unions are necessary to cope with challenges generated by national markets and the modern corporation; and 3) that certain national institutional arrangements are more effective than others at adapting to changing political-economic circumstances.1
Yet the new terms of international competition and technological innovation have challenged each of these underlying conditions. Markets have become simultaneously globalized and segmented while new technologies have provided opportunities for individual firms and entire industries to experiment with alternative business strategies and structures. 2 Together these developments test and/or transcend the boundaries of traditional industrial relations practices.For instance, while national industrial unions have proven unwilling, or perhaps unable, to adjust to or even accomodate these changes, individual films have pursued a variety of alternative arrangements with labor. This combination of micro-level effervescence and macro-level paralysis has provoked a proliferation of diverse patterns of industrial relations within and not simply across nations. Some of these sub-national labor-management arrangements appear to have more in common with their equivalents in other countries than with other industrial relations patterns coexisting within the same national borders. In short, just as the creation of national markets and the rise of the national union were central to the development of national industrial relations systems theory, now the demise of these conditions creates the need for new explanations.
Through an analysis of recent changes in Italian industrial relations, this paper makes a case for a new approach to comparative industrial relations research and theory. Instead of treating national systems as the basic unit of analysis and searching for macro-institutional features as the key dimensions to use in constructing comparative typologies of industrial relations systems, the approach developed here focuses on micro-level developments and the politics of strategic choice to explain variation within nations. This approach builds on previous work in industrial relations which employs strategic choice theory to explain managerial behavior 3 but extends this analysis to labor unions in order to identify the relevant forces shaping their divergent responses to industrial change.
To illustrate this approach, this paper analyzes the reorganization of Italy's two leading automobile producers --Fiat Auto and Alfa Romeo. These cases are interesting for a variety of reasons. First, both firms have historically played major roles in Italy's economy and have often set the pattern of industrial relations elsewhere in the country. The development of work relations and the balance of power in these firms reveals (often in extreme form) 4 the situation elsewhere in the country. Second, in many ways Fiat and Alfa have acted as advanced laboratories for Italian industrial relations. Since the late 1960s these firms have witnessed several experiments in both the organization of production and the strategy of the union movement. Finally, union experiences with industrial adjustment at these two firms have been radically different. While Fiat Auto reorganized by asserting managerial control and repressing the unions, Alfa Romeo experienced a more negotiated process. Moreover, whereas both firms emerged more competitive as a result of the reorganization, the outcomes for the two unions differed sharply :
Alfa's unions managed to preserve, if not enhance their-strength while Fiat's unions lost membership and practically all influence on the shop floor. This divergence is especially interesting given that both firms share the same ownership, their workforces are organized by the same unions, their plants possess similar technologies, and they operate within the same national setting. This paper argues that two factors are key to explaining these different outcomes : local socio-economic conditions which shape the strategies of unions and management in firms undergoing adjustment; and the choices unions make in reallocating responsibilities between local and national structures. The argument will be laid out in three parts. The first part examines the rise and decline of the national union in Italy. The second section illustrates this development at the micro-level through an in-depth analysis of industrial restructuring in the Italian automobile industry. The implications of this analysis for ~mparative industrial relations theory and research are discussed in the conclusion.
The Rise and Fall of the National Union in Italy
National unions arose throughout the West in response to the emergence of the modern corporation and the creation of national markets. 5 These national industrial unions were characterized by two basic features : organizational hierarchies in which vertical industry structures dominated local and regional union bodies and national contracts standardized wages and working conditions throughout the industry; and firm-level functionalism in which managerial authority was respected and unions merely grieved or negotiated the impact of managerial decisions.
These two basic features were mutually reinforcing. For example, in response to the growth of national markets, national unions standardized wages and working conditions across plants and industrial sectors. These practices, in turn, helped sustain the consumer demand that created national markets based on mass production of standardized goods. Similarly, as industrial production became centered around large firms employing semi-skilled workers to produce standardized commodities according to a strict division of labor within the plant, national industrial unions increasingly focused their organizational strategies around these workers, often at the expense of other segments of the working class. Union contracts also sought to regulate rather than transform the emergent division of labor within plants.
The recent transformation of national markets and consequent proliferation of diverse business practices not only across but also within the same industries have undermined the organizational rationale for the supremacy of national industrial unions. In fact, these vertical structures appear nable to adapt to the variety of corporate structures and strategies emerging within their sectors. The union's place within the firm is also changing. Functional distinctions between different kinds of jobs or between labor and management more generally are becoming blurred in firms where new technologies require broadly skilled workers capable of performing a variety of jobs. 6 This transformation of work combined with the increased participation of new types of workers (women, youth, part-time) in the labor market has shrunk the traditional power base (emi-skilled male workers) of most industrial unions. And even these traditional workers have become disgruntled with national union structures which appear unable to represent, let alone defend their interests. In short, both constituent elements of the postwar industrial relations system --the supremacy of national industrial unions and firm- The union movement was the creation of these political parties. Because the postwar labor movement had to rebuild more or less from scratch, union structures at all levels were creations of the central confederations in Rome. Rank-and-file workers and pre-fascist trade unionists had little to do with the reconstruction of the Italian union movement. Indeed, many of the CGIL's initial union leaders were recruited directly from political parties, often having little previous union experience. 7 With the advent of the Cold War, both government and labor coalitions dissolved. The Catholic current of the CGIL eventually established itself as the Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) while the Republican and Social-Democratic trade union leaders set-up the Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori (UIL). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the politics and strategies of the three union confederations were shaped by their political affiliations and rivalries. 8 Increased collaboration during the "hot autumn" led to a form of reunification in 1972 with the signing of the Federative Pact. Within the Federazione Unitaria CGIL-CISL-UIL, each confederation retained its autonomy at all levels of the union hierarchy but new joint structures aimed at coordinating decisions among these existing organizations were also created. 9 The federation dissolved in 1984, due to disagreements between the Communists in the CGIL and the rest of the labor movement over an Italian Communist Party (PCI) sponsored referendum abrogating a government decree revising the scala mobile (system of wage indexation). Since then, the three confederations have continued to cooperate in contract negotiations notwithstanding increasing antagonism over issues like flexible work hours, internal mobility and contingent compensation schemes. Even the triennial industry-wide collective bargaining negotiations (CCNLs), the institutional basis of the metalworkers' power, began to elude their control as individual employers and local unions resisted national accords which continued to standardize working conditions, work hours, and job classifications throughout the industry. These micro-level actors argued that national industry-wide contracts were overly rigid and unresponsive to their particular needs. As a result, both the sequencing and the content of these industry agreements began to change in ways that further eroded the leadership role of the national industrial unions.
For example, master agreements (CCNLs) used to be negotiated every three years and renewals were essentially automatic. Negotiations by union locals at individual firms were mere addenda to these more standardized national contracts and usually took place within one year of the signing of the national agreements. and 2). While we must be careful not to overinterpret these developments, it seems safe to infer that these trends suggest that the national metalworkers union experiences substantial difficulties in developing, let alone implementing contracts capable of covering the wide array of experiences prevalent within the same industry. To better appreciate how this process occured, the next section of this paper will analyze the reorganization of Italy's two leading automobile manufacturers --Fiat Auto and Alfa Romeo. The discussion will proceed in two stages. First it will describe the restructuring processes of each firm. Then, it will compare the divergent outcomes of the two companies and analyze them according to the alternative approach outlined above. Factory work also began to change. Production was organized by sequence and American semi-automatic single-purpose machine tools were introduced.
Interestingly enough, the metalworkers' union, FIOM, not only agreed to these changes (in return for increased piece rates) but also reorganized its structures to match the emergent fordist order. 1 9 While two world wars and the autarkic economic policies of the Fascist regime delayed the realization of Agnelli's plans for about forty years, by the late That very night an agreement was signed which represented a major defeat for the union. The agreement met with resistance from the more militant factions of the local union but was signed and pushed through for approval by the national industry federations. Despite initial attempts by the local labor movement to claim victory in this strike, it marked a major defeat from which the unions never recovered 23
With the union out of the way, Fiat embarked on a major reorganization of its production processes. Its products were re-designed so that many new models with greater differentiation in appearance but more common components were These new technologies also transcended traditional job classification schemes as they simultaneously rendered certain traditional jobs redundant while also creating new positions for people capable of both operating and servicing these new process technologies (e.g., meccatronico). Since the skill requirements and responsibilities for these new jobs did not fit nicely into traditional job classification schemes, and as increasing numbers of workers began to occupy these new jobs, the unions found themselves with an anachronistic classification system.
What to do with these workers placed the unions in a difficult position. Either way they would lose since they would either antagonize new workers by not fully appreciating their skills, or anger their traditional constituency of semi-skilled workers by appearing to favor the new workers with the extra bonuses and privileges associated with higher classification levels.
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Finally, the reconceptualization of the automobile as a composite of modular macro-component systems overhauled prior production and sourcing arrangements as engines, brake systems, dashboards and seats could be produced by specialized suppliers working in collaboration with Fiat. Since these "make or buy" decisions seemed to be continuously renegotiated by the firm and given that many of these suppliers were also organized by the metalworkers union, it became increasingly difficult for the union to develop a viable position on these issues.
Perhaps more damaging for union practices than the actual changes in production, was the way these changes were implemented by the firm. For the first half of the decade, Fiat management circumvented the unions, negotiating directly with workers over issues concerning retraining, flexible work hours, and modifications of their jobs. While these modifications were significant enough to match the changes underway in the organization of production they were not so dramatic as to necessitate formal renegotiations of job classification schemes, etc. If the-situation is precarious for workers within the firm, it was even more dismal for those workers expelled from the factories. The most evident sign of the severe dislocation resulting from Fiat's restructuring and the defeat of the union was the existence and fate of the "cassintearati", i.e., the redundant workers supported by this special fund. Fiat alone placed 31,000 full-time workers in cassa integrazione while also employing this mechanism to lay-off other workers during This triad of high quality production, skilled workers and cooperative industrial relations continued to underpin the firm's industrial strategy in the postwar period. In fact, Alfa did not really embark on the mass production of autos until the early 1960s, when it opened its Arese plant outside Milan and doubled its productive capacity. Even then, it continued its tradition of high quality production through technical innovation (Alfa was famous for its technically advanced product development and design.) and labor-management cooperation. The results were impressive : over the course of the decade Alfa tripled its sales, doubled its workforce and became an internationally recognized leader in sportscars.
The success of this model, however, was fully appreciated only after it was abandoned for Fordism. In 1972, Alfa Romeo opened its Pomigliano plant outside of Naples and thus sought to break from its past and embark on a new path of development. With the Pomigliano plant, Alfa sought to change its traditional product differentiation-based strategy and instead manufacture a new product, the Alfasud, which was a small, economy car, for a mass market (which the firm knew little about since its traditional products are extremely expensive and cater to a small niche of clients), in a new way (using unskilled workers and highly automated and dedicated equipment).31 That the firm sought to change its strategy exactly at the moment when the European automobile industry began to suffer from overcapacity, increased fuel and labor costs, and greater international competition, may explain the disastrous results this change in strategy had for the firm. That these two productive poles were operated more or less as two distinct companies, with seperate managements and autonomous design, purchasing and marketing offices, may also account for the poor results experienced by Alfa during the 1970s.
In fact, following the opening of Pomigliano, Alfa never again turned a profit and what was once seen as the pride and joy of Italian state enterprise languished for over a decade before it was finally restructured.
To further exacerbate the firm's troubles, labor relations at Alfa (both in the North and the South) became extremely conflictual in the 1970s. Like Fiat, Alfa Romeo experienced an especially militant wave of strikes and worker mobilization during the hot autumn. While instigated and for the most part controlled by older union militants, here too Southern migrant workers were active in the strikes. 3 2 In fact, unions at Alfa became so powerful that they were often able to achieve their goals with no more than the threat of strikes. While absenteeism and hours lost to work stoppages increased dramatically over the decade, productivity and product quality plummeted. 3 3 The climate of industrial relations at the Pomigliano plant became so horrible that industrial sociologists dedicate volumes to understand this case of "anomolous conflictuality". 3 4 Yet, the way Alfa sought to deal with its troubles was radically different from Fiat. For example, in the early 1980s, the local union and Alfa's management negotiated a series of accords aimed at both increasing the firm's productivity and enriching workers' skills. Out of these agreements emerged the homogenous production groups (GPO), teams of 10-20 laborers working on different segments of the production line. Essentially, the assembly line was divided into various segments with groups of workers assigned to these segments. Within these groups, workers rotated various jobs as a way of eliminating monotony and increasing their skills. Quality control and maintenance work were also relegated to these groups. As a result of these changes, productivity increased 35% within a year, product quality improved and a number of indirect and supervisory jobs were eliminated from the factory. 3 5 The success of this experiment appeared so great that one of Aifa's personnel managers wrote a book arguing that one could "forget Turin"
("dimenticare Torino") in this new phase of "negotiated restructuring".36 In fact, both absenteeism and strikes decreased significantly following these accords (See Table 3 ).
While a variety of factors including the increased militancy of the local FIM and the subsequent dissolution of union unity at Alfa, the break-down of the firm's logistic system (making it nearly impossible to maintain production schedules, let alone product quality), a series of management turn-overs, and persistent under-investment, especially in new product and process technologies, all combined to undermine the production group experience, 3 If anything, Alfa's financial difficulties were much more serious than Fiat's.
Moreover, other foreign companies competing with Fiat in exactly the same market segments appear to have restructured in vastly different ways. 3 9 Thus, competitive strategy alone can not explain the observed differences.
Another explanation commonly offered to account for the divergent patterns of industrial relations at these two firms focuses on the fact that Alfa (until 1986) was a state-owned firm and thus, its management could be more relaxed about economic goals like efficiency and sales, permitting it to be "easier" on the unions.
However, a recent study reviewing management practices at Alfa during these years indicates that Alfa's management was no more benevolent towards the unions than Due to its hegemonic position, Fiat was able to dominate local government, control local business and cultural associations, and thus, more or less determine the development of the city. Fiat management also cultivated an extremely authoritarian, hierarchical vision of its role. 4 4 Thus, during the early years of the firm, through the long tenure of Vittorio Valletta, and continuing to this day, Fiat management has sought to control the firm's development unilaterally. As a result, management promoted pro-business political forces and company unions. It also sought to tame its workforce through a combination of repression and paternalism and undermined all attempts at alternative bases of power (i.e., the postwar comanagement councils, consiali di aestione) within its plants.
This particular model of development had a major impact on the local labor movement. 4 5 Local unions were esseantially weak organizations with strong ideologies. Antagonism towards the firm combined with a maximalist vision of politics to create a local labor movement which perceived itself (and at times sought to act) as the vanguard of the Italian labor movement. 4 6 For instance, peculiar to the local labor movement are its frequent experiences with spontaneous worker upsurges, regularly followed by the politicization of industrial relations. This But due to their own historical development even they are quite radical and actually exacerbate rather than diminish antagonisms between labor and management at Fiat. 4 8 In sum, the local union at Fiat was a highly political but organizationally weak structure located in a city lacking potential mediators of industrial conflict. It is no suprise, therefore, that repeated attempts by groups within the local union and firm to construct a more negotiated and stable form of industrial relations at Fiat failed. 4 9 The contrast with Alfa is striking. As we have seen, Alfa developed in such a way that preserved workers' skills and reinforced local union organizations through much of this century. Unlike at Fiat, the union at Alfa was never seriously repressed during the postwar period. Thus, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as well as after the hot autumn, the union at Alfa consisted of a sizeable group of disciplined old-guard unionists who promoted shop floor bargaining. This group was active in all debates over union politics and played a major role in the negotiated restructuring of the firm in the 1980s.
The local union was always a stronger and more complex organization than its equivalent at Fiat and thus, less subject to the vicissitudes of the more movement-oriented union in Turin. 50 Moreover, the auto industry is only one of many industries in the area and while Alfa is the largest factory in Milan, the metalworkers are not hegemonic in the same way they are in Turin. well. 5 6 Nor is this process limited to industrial relations. In a variety of other social science fields, new work stressing the decreasing salience of national models is emerging. In political science, for example, discussions of "neo-corporatism" and consociationalism have evolved away from country-based explanations to more sectoral or regionally differentiated accounts. 5 7 The same is true for analyses of corporate strategy and industrial organization. 5 8 New research in comparative industrial relations needs to investigate the determinants underlying these diverse sub-national patterns. In the same way that this paper sought to identify the key variables shaping the two patterns of industrial relations observed in Italy, we could begin comparing seemingly analogous sub-national models across nations in order to better grasp the political factors shaping the strategic choices implicit within each one. Once we better understand the determinants and consequnces of each of these micro-level patterns, we can begin to analyze the different mixes or distributions of these sub-national models across nations. Only if one or a particular set of models emerges as dominant in a given country should we return to the convention of comparing industrial relations systems in terms of national models. If this happens, we will be on our way towards reconstructing national models which highlight rather than obscure the dynamic relationship which exists between local practices and national regulatory institutions.
If not, we must construct completely new typologies, based perhaps on more local Maintaining unity amid the increasing diversity of the labor movement will not be easy. While some unions appear to be able to achieve this balance, others have failed. As the Italian metalworkers' case illustrates, maintaining traditional structures and strategies in the face of radical economic change simply does not work. Times have changed and unions must change accordingly.
The transformation of the union away from its previous vertical, highly bureaucratic structures and toward a more horizontal, perhaps more democratic, organization has begun to take shape, but only after much internal debate and several set-backs. Perhaps it is safe to say that it took the defeat at Fiat for the metalworkers to respond differently at Alfa.
The reconstruction of the labor movement along more horizontal lines --as a federation of strong locals firmly embedded in their regional economies --may be a viable solution for the entire labor movement. Just as the national union was the appropriate organizational solution in the previous era of national markets and large, bureaucratic corporations, the federation of strong locals could be most adept at representing the interests of workers in this period of market fragmentation and continuous industrial change. Whether this alternative arrangment is possible, and if so, whether it is sufficient to save organized labor, can not be answered at present.
These question are the focus of future research. Nonetheless, if this essay has been at all convincing, it will have stimulated you to think that this alternative line of inquiry is worth pursuing. Given divergent structures and patterns of arrangements, typologies were developed which classify industrial relations systems according to whether they are organizationally centralized or not, whether they defend narrow job classification schemes or encourage broad skills, whether their allied political parties are in power or in opposition, and whether their ideologies are revolutionary, reformist, or as in the United States, "business-like". The peculiarities of these institutional arrangements reflect the particular national histories of these different states. In fact, these institutions are the organizational legacy of past struggles between industrial relations actors.
From this classification scheme, industrial relations systems are organized along a continuum, with the United Kingdom and the United States on one end, due to their fragmented union structures and emphasis on collective bargaining between labor and management, and Austria and Sweden on the other end, with their centralized structures and peak-level bargaining. French and Italian unions are situated somewhere in between because of their weak structures, highly politicized strategies and dependence on the state.
These typologies are not merely descriptive. They are also normative and imply that certain systems are more "mature" or stable than others. For instance, following the economic crisis of the 1970s numerous scholars argued that nations with centralized interest organizations, peak-level bargaining and Social Democratic governments were better able to weather the crisis since they were capable of implementing neo-corporatist policies which traded wage moderation and labor peace for increased investment and price freezes. These neo-corporatist arrangements, it was argued, were responsible for the lower inflation and unemployment rates and more stable economic growth of these countries. 
